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Recent Cases
CIVIL PROCEDURE-THE ACTIVE-PASSIVE NEGLIGENCE
INDEMNITY THEORY
Listerman v. Day and Night Pl-mbing & Heating Serv.
Defendant Day and Night contracted to install a "free standing fireplace
heater" in plaintiff Listerman's house. The job required sheet metal work in
running a flue pipe, so Day and Night subcontracted with Empire Sheet Metal
Company to make the actual installation. No employees of Day and Night were
present when Empire made the installation. However, Day and Night inspected
and approved the finished work at plaintiff's request. Shortly after the heater
was lit for the first time, fire broke out in the roof of the house in the vicinity of
the flue pipe causing over $1,000 damage. Plaintiff sued Day and Night alleging
negligence in failing to properly insulate the flue pipe near the roof level. Day
and Night impleaded Empire as third-party defendant asserting a right to in-
demnity. The court sitting as a jury gave plaintiff judgment for $1,250 against
Day and Night, and gave Day and Night a judgment for the same amount plus
attorney's fees against Empire. Plaintiff Listerman's judgment was satisfied by
Day and Night, but Empire appealed to the Springfield Court of Appeals after
its motion for a new trial was denied.
The court of appeals affirmed, holding this a proper case for indemnity. It
found Empire's status to be that of an independant subcontractor, and that plain-
tiff's recovery was based "upon negligence imputed to Day and Night by reason
of its legal relation with Empire." 2 Day and Night's negligence in not discovering
the dangerous condition was not alleged by plaintiff, -but the court noted that
under Missouri law negligence consisting solely in failure to discover and correct
a dangerous condition will not preclude indemnity. While this analysis would
have been adequate to support the decision, the court also used a distinction be-
tween active and passive negligence as a basis for indemnity-Day and Night was
entitled to indemnity because only "passively" negligent while Empire was the
"actively" negligent wrongdoer.' Unfortunately the court followed the example of
the authority it cited by using the terms without defining them. The use of the
additional "theory" in this situation points out the confusion surrounding the whole
active-passive negligence approach to indemnity cases. The question presented is
whether this approach is actually a separate indemnity theory based on some dif-
1. 384 S.W.2d 111 (Spr. Mo. App. 1964).





et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1965
RECENT CASES
ference in degree or kind of negligence, or whether the terms are merely intended
to-cover a variety of indemnity situations without detailed legal analysis.
A non-contractural right to indemnification arises where one person is sub-
jected to liability because of the conduct of another person, rather than because
of his own personal negligence. This liability, variously called "constructive,"
"derivative," or "secondary" liability, allows indemnification under theories of im-
plied contract, quasi-contract, or implied warranty. Secondary liability arises in
three situations: "(1) liability imposed because of legal relations with the one
primarily liable; (2) some positive rule of common or statutory law; or (3) a
failure to discover or correct a dangerous condition."T In McDonnell Aircraft Corp.
v. Hartman-Hanks-Was Printing Co.$ the Missouri Supreme Court recognized
these main categories and followed the Restatement in putting indemnity on a
principle "similar to a quasi-contractural basis."9 In the course of its analysis the
court also reviewed theories used by other states, including the active-passive
negligence theory, and decided none were satisfactory 10
The use of the distinction between active and passive negligence as a basis
for indemnity is a recent development in the Missouri cases." After previously
5. 1 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs § 10.2, at 723 (1956); Pnossmt, ToRTs § 48, at
279 (3d ed. 1964).
6. Wright, Procedure-Tltird Party Practice-Non-Contractual Indemnifica-
tion, 28 Mo. L. Ray. 307, 308 (1963).
7. Id. at 309.
8. 323 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. 1959).
9. Id. at 793; RESTATEMENT, REsTIrtrrIoN §§ 76, 95, 96 (1937).
10. McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Printing Co., supra
note 8, at 793.
11. It should be noted that the active-passive negligence terminology has
long been used in Missouri in describing the liability of a tortfeasor to an injured
party, particularly in the area of the land owner's duties to persons on the
premises. In Wolfson v. Chelist, 278 S.W.2d 39 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955), aff'd, 284
S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1955), a social guest slipped on a grease spot on the host's porch
and was injured. In reversing the trial court's judgment for the guest the St. Louis
Court of Appeals said: "'Active negligence' is negligence occurring in connection
with activities conducted on the premises, whereas 'passive negligence' denotes
negligence which permits or causes dangers upon the property." 278 S.W.2d at 47.
A similar view was expressed in Anderson v. Cinnamon, 282 S.W.2d 445, 450 (Mo.
En Banc 1955), when the court noted that "the failure to warn is negative rather
than active in its nature." In this context the terms active and passive negligence
are used to describe the type of physical acts giving rise to liability. Active negli-
gence requires affirmative conduct that directly causes the injury, while passive
negligence embraces creation of or failure to correct a dangerous condition. De-
pending on the duty he owes to the injured plaintiff, a defendant could be passive-
ly negligent in one sense, yet primarily liable, as in the case of an invitee injured
by a dangerous condition on the defendant's premises. The courts apply another
meaning to the term "passive negligence" in the indemnity situation, because when
used in indemnity cases it is equated with secondary liability. A defendant cannot
be both primarily liable and passively negligent where indemnity is the issue-if
passively negligent his liability is treated as though it were secondary or derivative,
while the "actively negligent" third-party defendant is treated as the primarily
liable party. It is on this basis that indemnity is granted. See also RESTATEMENT(SacoND), TORTS § 441, comment b (1965), for the use of active-passive negligence
terminology in relation to an intervening force situation.
1965]
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discussing but refusing to use the active-passive negligence approach in the
McDonnel case, the Missouri Supreme Court used this language in Kansas City
So. Ry. Co. u. Payway Feed Mills, Inc. 12 when it stated "the negligence of
the party responsible for the dangerous condition is active and primary while the
negligence of the other is passive and secondary." 3 Whether the terms active and
passive negligence were used as synonyms for primary and secondary liability for the
purpose of emphasis, or whether they were intended as a supplemental indemnity
theory based on an actual difference in kind or degree of negligence was not made
clear. The court seemed to retreat from these terms in Crouch v. Tourtelot"4 when it
observed that even though discussions of active and passive negligence may occa-
sionaly appear in the cases, "it will be found in at least the vast majority of our
cases, when the facts are accurately evaluated, that indemnity has been allowed
in favor of one who is held responsible solely by imputation of law because of his
relation to the actual wrongdoer."' 5 The active-passive negligence distinction was
used again in Woods v. Juvenile Shoe Corp.,' but there it was related to the acts
from which liability arose-actively creating a dangerous condition was active
negligence while failing to discover a dangerous condition was mere passive negli-
gence.' 7 Subsequent decisions have done little to clarify the situation, and the
exact status of the terms is still uncertain.'
A number of other jurisdictions have attempted to solve their indemnity prob-
lems through the use of active and passive negligence, but the results have in gen-
eral been less than satisfactory. The New York courts, the pioneers in the use of
this terminology, have given various statements of the "theory," all of which
12. 338 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1960).
13. Id. at 5.
14. 350 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. En Banc 1961).
15. Id. at 805.
16. 361 S.W.2d 694 (Mo. 1962).
17. Id. at 697. The court held the shoe manufacturer was actively negligent in
creating a dangerous condition by leaving a nail protruding into the shoe, while
the retailer was only passively negligent in failing to inspect and discover the
danger.
18. In Johnson v. California Spray-Chem. Co., 362 S.W.2d 630 (Mo. 1962),
indemnity was denied because the third-party plaintiff was guilty of active negli-
gence. A later case, Union Elec. Co. v. Magary, 373 S.W.2d 16, 22 (Mo. 1963),
was distinguished from Payway "on the same grounds and for the same reasons
given in Crouch v. Tourtelot, namely, that Union Electric's negligence was active
: * , not merely a failure to discover and correct" the dangerous condition. It is
interesting to note that the court in Union Elec. quoted Crouch with approval and
distinguished Payway but still used active-passive negligence. The court hearing
Pierce v. Ozark Border Elec. Coop., 378 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Mo. 1964), stated the
case before it was not distinguishable from Union Elec., but no indemnity was al-
lowed because the case involved joint tort-feasors, "both under a common liability
and not a primary and secondary one." Campbell v. Preston, 379 S.W.2d 557, 559
(Mo. 1964), contains a good discussion of various indemnity situations without use
of active-passive negligence terminology. The court summarized: "As a general
rule, indemnity is allowed in favor of one who is held responsible solely by imputa-
tion of law because of his relation to the actual wrongdoer, as where an employer
is vicariously liable for the tort of an employee or in favor of one who was under
a secondary duty where another was primarily responsible."
[Vol. 30
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make it clear that it is the nature of the liability rather than the type of physical
acts giving rise to liability that is being described.' 9 However, even consistent use
of the active-passive negligence approach to indemnity has not eliminated the
confusion as to meaning because the terms have been applied in too many varied
situations.20 One writer went so far as to conclude "the resulting tangle which is
the New York law of indemnity is reason enough for any court to steer clear of
the use of the 'passive-active' formula."21 A federal court in Michigan may have
pointed the way to the solution when it stated "a person is passively negligent
only when he did not participate in the commission of the tort; and his liability
arises only by operation of law."- This approach equates passive negligence with
secondary or derivative liability and is consistant with several other jurisdictions.28
What the Missouri courts mean when using active-passive negligence as a
basis for indemnity remains uncertain. If this is indeed a distinct theory -based on
either varying kinds or degrees of negligence the court should make this clear. If,
as is more probable, the terms are merely synonyms for other terms long in use
such as primary-secondary liability, then they serve no useful purpose. In fact, if
the latter is true they actually add confusion because what is being described is not
differing types or degrees of negligence, but a basis of liability arising by operation
of law. The Listerman case is a goood illustration of why clarification is badly needed
because while the court recognized that Day and Night was liable merely due to
operation of law-the legal relation between contractor and employer-it still went
on to discuss active and passive negligence. Day and Night was liable because of a
contract relation, and its personal negligence was not an issue in the case. The
discussion of negligence merely added verbage without adding clarity.
THOMAS J. ENIS
19. E.g., Jackson v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 13 N.Y.2d 112, 116, 242
N.Y.S.2d 210, 213 (1963) ("Active negligence, however, is not determined by
whether the conduct of the party seeking indemnification is affirmative or permis-
sive, for acts of omission as well as acts of commission may constitute active
negligence."); Putvin v. Buffalo Elec. Co., 5 N.Y.2d 447, 456, 158 N.E.2d 691,
696 (1959) ("Either a fault of omission or one of commission may constitute active
negligence."); Note: Indemnity Among Joint Tort-feasors in New York: Active
and Passive Negligence and Impleader, 28 FoRHAm L. REV. 782, 786-788 (1960).
20. See Note: Indemnity Among Tortfeasors in New York, 39 CORNELL L.Q.
484, 499 (1954); Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors: A Proposed
Rationale, 37 Iowa L. Ray. 517, 537 (1952); Meriam & Thornton, Indemnity Be-
tween Tortfeasors: An Evolving Doctrine in the New York Court of Appeals, 25
N.Y.U.L. REv. 845, 858 (1950).
21. Davis, supra note 20, at 539.
22. Pelkey v. States Sales, 210 F.Supp. 924, 925 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
23. E.g., Chicago & Illinois Midland Ry. Co. v. Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 47 IlL
App. 2d 373, 377, 198 N.E.2d 126, 129 (1964); Pennsylvania Threshermen &
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CORPORATIONS-DIRECTORS' CONTRACTS WITH THE CORPORATION
-BURDEN OF PROOF
Binz v. St." Louis Hide and Tallow Co.l
Plaintiff, who was a minority shareholder in St. Louis Hide and Tallow Com-
pany, brought suit on behalf of the corporation and himself to recover salaries
which the directors of the corporation voted to themselves. The principal de-
fendants were three shareholders who constituted three of the four members of
the board of directors of the defendant corporation and were also its officers. The
board set the salary of the president at $6000 per year, and then delegated to
him the authority to set the other officers' salaries. The president set the salaries
of the vice-president and the secretary at $6000 per year. Plaintiff brought suit
in the circuit court of St. Louis to compel the three individual defendants to ac-
count for the salaries paid them. The circuit court found that, since the plaintiff
had not proved that the salaries paid to the defendants were unreasonable and it
was the plaintiff's burden to do so, the defendants need not account to the corpora-
tion for salaries paid them. Plaintiff appealed on the grounds that the burden of
proof on the reasonableness of the salaries should have been on the defendants.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court and held that the bur-
den was on the defendants.
According to the great weight of authority in Missouri, contracts between a
corporation and one or more of its directors are voidable at the option of the
corporation, where the interested director's presence was necessary to constitute
a quorum or where his vote was necessary to approve the contract.2 This rule
has been applied without regard to whether the contract was reasonable or fair
to the corporation.3 It is immaterial that the corporation was not harmed by the
transaction or that the director acted with utmost good faith.4 A director is re-
garded as occupying a fiduciary relationship to his corporation, and may not deal
with the property of his cestui que trust for his own benefit. A strict rule is deemed
necessary to prevent unfairness or fraud by the director. However, where the
corporation is represented by a disinterested majority of the board, the rule is
otherwise. In such a case, the contract with the director may be avoided only if
it is unfair to the corporation or entered into in bad faith.5 The possibility of un-
fairness is greatly reduced where the corporation is represented by an independent
majority.
The problem of deciding what constitutes a disinterested majority of the
board of directors -has been difficult in some cases. For example, in FUnsten v.
1. 378 S.W.2d 228 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964).
2. Glassburn v. Lakeland Dev. Co., 340 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. 1960); Frankford
Exchange Bank v. McCune, 72 S.W.2d 155 (St. L. Mo. App. 1934); Hill v. Rich
Hill Coal Mining Co., 119 Mo. 9, 24 S.W. 223 (1893); R. T. Davis Mill Co. v. Ben-
nett, 39 Mo. App. 460 (K.C. Ct. App. 1889).
3. Hill v. Rich Hill Coal Mining Co., supra note 2.
4. Bromschwig v. Carthage Marble & White Lime Co., 334 Mo. 319, 66
S.W.2d 889 (1933).
5. Kitchen v. St. Louis, K.C. & No. Ry., 69 Mo. 224, 254 (1878).
[Vol. .30
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Funsten Com'en Co.,6 the three directors of defendant, A, -B, and C, who were also
its officers, met to fix salaries. B and C fixed A's salary. Then A, B, and C voted
affirmatively for a resolution setting the salaries of B and C. The St. Louis Court
of Appeals said the salaries of B and C were validly set because the portion of the
resolution by which B's salary was set might well have been supported by the
affirmative votes of A and C, two disinterested directors. The court ignored the
fact that C would be interested in passing the resolution because it also set his
salary, and that A would be interested because his salary may have depended on
his support of the salaries of B and C. The court, in the noted case, chose to
ignore the Funsten holding. It considered the action of the board in setting the
president's salary, together with the delegation to him of the authority to set their
salaries, as "self-dealing." This strongly indicates that the Funsten case will be ig-
nored in Missouri.7
Once it has been disclosed that the corporation was not represented by a dis-
interested majority of the board in dealing with a director, the dealing is void-
able without inquiry into its fairness, according to the majority view. However,
there is now authority in Missouri for the view that even where a corporation is not
represented by a disinterested majority, contracts between the corporation and
an interested director can be avoided only if unfair to the corporation. This would
place Missouri in line with the so-called "enlightened minority."" In Yax v. Dit-
Mco, Inc.,9 the Missouri Supreme Court upheld a sale of shares to the corporation
where two out of five directors of the corporation were personally interested in the
sale and one of their votes was necessary to pass the resolution authorizing the
sale, since one of the non-interested directors abstained. A disinterested majority
of the -board was not possible. The court chose not to mention this fact, when
they could easily have held the transaction void for want of a disinterested ma-
jority. They looked instead at the fairness of the transaction, and said, "The
board of directors could properly authorize the Company to purchase the shares
it did purchase for a fair and reasonable price (conceded in this case) where it
appears that the transaction was entered into in good faith and considered to be
in the best interests of the Company."1° This holding is a departure from previous
Missouri cases, and from what is regarded as the majority view throughout the
country, as to contracts made where a disinterested majority of directors is not
present. The court in the noted case strongly endorsed the view that such con-
tracts will be sustained if fair. It recognized that the directors had dealt with
themselves, but stated "whether or not the corporation suffered any detriment is
the ultimate issue.""±
If a transaction between a corporation and an interested director is challenged
6. 67 Mo. App. 559 (1896).
7. See Steele v. Gold Fissure Gold Mining Co., 42 Col. 529, 95 Pac. 349
(1908), criticizing Funsten.
8. Comment, 19 CALmF. L. REv. 304, 305 (1931).
9. 366 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1963), noted in Brauninger, Corporations-In-
terested Directors Dealing with the Corporation, 29 Mo. L. Rav. 90 (1964).
10. Id. at 367.
11. Binz v. St. Louis Hide and Tallow Co., supra, note 1, at 231.
19651
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by the corporation or by a shareholder in a derivative suit, where should the bur-
den of proof on the issue of fairness of the contract lie? The courts generally place
upon the interested director the burden of proving the contract fair if he wishes
to uphold it2.2 The reason for the rule seems to lie in the fiduciary relationship of a
director to his corporation. The law imposes upon him a duty to act with the ut-
most good faith and to exercise the powers given him solely in the interests of the
corporation and its shareholders, and not in his own interest.'$ It is assumed that
if a director represents both himself and the corporation in a transaction in which
their interests are adverse, he will favor his own interests over those of the
corporation. It is well established that because of his fiduciary relationship with
the corporation, a director should not profit by dealing with it."- However, this
strict rule that a director cannot profit from dealings with his corporation seems
to have been changed by the more liberal holdings such as YaX v. Dit-Mco, Inc.
A director may profit if the corporation also profits at the same time. But since
the director profits from the transaction, he should bear the burden of proving that
the corporation has been fairly dealt with, since his duty is first and foremost to
uphold the interests of the corporation.
A distinction is not made -between the cases in which the corporation is repre-
sented by a disinterested majority and quorum and those in which it is not, in
determining where the burden of proving fairness will be. Where there is a disin-
terested majority and quorum, the majority of cases still place the burden of prov-
ing the contract's fairness on the interested director 5 However, there is respectable
authority to the contrary,10 and it is arguable that the corporation is adequately
protected when a majority of disinterested directors is representing it. But this
argument has no validity where there is no disinterested majority to protect the
corporation. If fair contracts between an interested director and his corporation
are to be upheld where the corporation is not represented by a disinterested ma-
jority, the reason and necessity for the rule placing the burden of showing fair-
12. E.g., Brown v. Grand Rapids Parlor Furniture Co., 58 Fed. 286, (6th Cir.
1893) (corporation giving preference to director-creditor over other creditors);
Gropper v. North Cent. Texas Oil Co., 35 Del. Ch. 198, 114 A.2d 231 (1955)
(corporation selling property to or buying property from director); Fountain v.
Oreck's, Inc., 245 Minn. 202, 71 N.W.2d 646 (1955) (directors establishing their
own compensation); Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Peteler Car Co., 132 Minn.
277, 156 N.W. 255 (1916)(director lending money to the corporation and taking
security from it).
13. 19 AM. JUR. 2d Corporations § 1272 (1965).
14. Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 157 N.W. 929 (1916).
15. Bromschwig v. Carthage Marble & White Lime Co., supra note 4; Pitman
v. Chicago Lead Co., 93 Mo. App. 592, 67 S.W. 946 (1902), aff'd on rehearing 113
Mo. App. 513, 87 S.W. 10 (1905). See MicH. STAT. ANN. § 21.13(5) (1963),
which expressly provides that no contract shall be invalid because made with a di-
rector, but puts the burden upon the director to prove that it is fair. However,
Veeser v. Robinson Hotel Co., 275 Mich. 133, 266 N.W. 54 (1936), limits the rule
permitting a director of a corporation to deal with it to cases where the corporation
is represented by a majority of disinterested directors.
16. Speigel v. Beacon Participations, 297 Mass. 398, 8 N.E. 2d 895 (1937);
Seitz v. Union Brass and Metal Mfg. Co., 152 Minn. 460, 189 N.W. 586 (1922).
See Annot., 27 A.L.R. 300 (1923) and cases cited therein.
7
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ness on the director is even more compelling, in view of the possibilities of unfair-
ness and overreaching in unrestricted dealings. This is the rule which the court
in the noted case adopts. Such a rule seems absolutely essential if Missouri is to
follow the rule that contracts between an interested director and his corporation
can be upheld if they are fair, where there is no disinterested majority to protect
the interests of the corporation.
HADLEY E. GRIMM
INSURANCE-ACCIDENTAL DEATH-DANGEROUS ACT
AS BAR TO RECOVERY
Applebury v. Joz n Hancock Mitt. Life Ins. Co.1
Insured died when his Buick automobile struck another automobile as the
latter pulled from a service station into the path of insured. Insured was fleeing
the police, driving 60 to 90 miles per hour at 1:00 a.m. on a city street in Kansas
City.
In this suit for the double indemnity on a policy insuring against "death ...
by external, violent and accidental means" insurer contended that insured died
as a result of voluntarily and wantonly exposing himself to unnecessary and known
danger, and therefore, that his death did not result from accidental means. The
policy contained several specific exclusions, but it did not exclude voluntary ex-
posure to danger.2
The trial court instructed the jury that in order to find for defendant-insurer
it must determine that (1) the insured must have reasonably anticipated death
or injury as the natural and probable consequence of his act and that (2) the in-
sured died as the result of exposing himself to unnecessary and known danger.
The court entered judgment on a verdict for defendant-insurer. Plaintiff-beneficiary
appealed. The Kansas City Court of Appeals affirmed the decision saying that this
act of driving constituted voluntary exposure to danger.3
The -basic problem is whether the death of the insured was accidental. An
deaths must be classified as (1) natural, (2) intentional or (3) accidental. Those
caused by insured's conduct can be only intentional or accidental. To determine
which, Missouri courts ask if, during his act, insured should have reasonably an-
1. 379 S.W.2d 867 (K.C. Mo. App. 1964).
2. The insurer also contended that insured was committing an assault, and
that he was committing a felony at the time of his death. These two defenses, how-
ever, were based on specific policy exclusions.
3. The court also said there was persuasive evidence that insured was guilty
of assault and manslaughter.
1965]
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ticipated and foreseen, as a natural and probable consequence thereof, that he
was likely to sustain bodily injury or death.4 This elucidates the basic definition
of an "accident" which is often stated as something unexpected, unusual and un-
foreseen.5 In Applebury the insured should have reasonably foreseen some risk of
possible injury, but he should not have expected that risk to be the usual res . t
of his conduct. To be usual, a result, here injury or death, would have to occur
most of the time. Reckless driving only rarely results in death or injury. Most
reckless drivers go unharmed. This is not to say that the possibility of death is no
greater where reckless driving occurs than where it does not; however, such increase
is not great enough to say that a driver should expect death as the usual result of
reckless conduct.
Most cases with facts similar to those in Applebury have held that the death
was accidental and that there was not an adequate showing that the insured ex-
pected death from his conduct. One such Missouri case is Ward v. Penn Mut. Life
Ins. Co.0 There, the insured, after leaving a tavern, rode "spread eagle" on top of
an automobile, fell off and was killed. The Springfield Court of Appeals affirmed a
finding of death by accidental means because the insured had previously ridden
"spread eagle" on top of an automobile without a mishap. Therefore, the insured
should not have reasonably foreseen any harm as a consequence of his act. In
Rogers v. Reserve Life Ins. Coj an insured drove 100 miles per hour after being
warned of an upcoming curve. The car missed the curve and the insured was killed.
In finding that the death was accidental the Illinois court said:
There is no evidence from which one would be justified in concluding that
the insured expected that he could not negotiate this curve or that his own
fast driving would result in his own death .... 18
In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Henkel 9 an insured was killed in an automobile
wreck after a ninety miles per hour police chase. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that the death was "clearly the result of acci-
dental means."10 A Georgia court in Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn. v. Benion1t
held that an insured's death which occurred as a result of his driving in a stock
car race was an accidental death. In a later Georgia decision, Union Cent. Life
iks. Co. v. Cofer,12 an insured drank liquor, wrecked 'his automobile and died.
Upon defendant-insurer's admission that there was no suicide, the court said that
4. Applebury v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 379 S.W.2d 867, 873 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1964); Ward v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 352 S.W.2d 413, 421 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1961).
5. Tomnitz v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 343 Mo. 321, 330, 121
S.W.2d 745, 749 (1938). See generally 1A APPLEMAN, INsURACcE LAW & PRAcrica
391 (1964).
6. 352 S.W.2d 413 (Spr. Mo. App. 1961).
7. 8 Ill. App. 2d 542, 132 N.E.2d 692 (1956).
8. Id. at 550, 132 N.E.2d at 696.
9. 234 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1956).
10. Id. at 70.
11. 82 Ga. App. 571, 61 S.E.2d 579 (1950).
12. 103 Ga. App. 355, 119 S.E.2d 281 (1961).
9
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this admission, ". . . standing alone 'practically if not completely eliminated any
question but that [the insured] met his death by accident or accidental means.'18
As a practical matter, Applebury might be distinguishable from the other
above cases because it was an appeal from a verdict for the defendant-insurer. The
other above cases were appeals from verdicts for the plaintiffs-beneficiaries. The
question of accidental death is one of mixed law and fact, and an appellate court is
sometimes more reluctant to upset the lower court's fact finding than to affirm
it. Often appellate courts affirm accidental death cases not on the basic and vital
issue of the accident itself, but on petty issues such as the distinction between acci-
dental death and accidental means.14
In addition to the issue of accident just discussed, the court needs to decide
only those matters specifically put forth by the policy. One such matter may be
exposure to danger.15 In Applebury, the policy was silent as to exposure to danger.
However, the court specifically required the jury to determine if insured died from
voluntarily exposing himself to danger.
The question of exposure to danger, while relevant to the issue of accident,
is not an issue itself unless stated in the policy and asserted in the defense. When
the policy is silent on the question of exposure to danger, and exposure to danger
is made an issue, it unduly prejudices the plaintiff because most contested accident
claims involve some exposure to danger by the insured. Thus the jury will most
likely rule against the plaintiff on this point. The jury then must consider the issue
of accident. Having ruled against the plaintiff once, the jury would be more likely
to rule against him on the "accident" question than they would if he had not al-
ready lost one decision. Their natural inclination would be to duplicate their first
decision because the second point is related thereto.
In addition to its lack of logic, making exposure to danger an issue when not
mentioned in the policy is not the law in Missouri. The Supreme Court of Mis-
souri, in Callalkan v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co.,'16 held that without a policy
exclusion an insured's negligence, intoxication or lack of judgment was not itself
13. Id. at 359, 119 S.E.2d at 285.
14. Caldwell v. Travelers Ins. Co., 305 Mo. 619, 267 S.W. 907 (En Banc 1924).
For a complete and able discussion of the impractical distinction between acci-
dental means and accidental result, see Pener, Insu~rance-Accident-Voluntary Ex-
posure To Danger, 23 Mo. L. REv. 89 (1958).
15. Even when exposure to danger is a specific policy exclusion, Missouri
courts are not uniform as to what degree of misconduct is necessary to bar recovery.
E.g., Landau v. Travelers Ins. Co., 315 Mo. 760, 287 S.W. 346 (En Banc 1926);
Bateman v. Travelers Ins. Co., 110 Mo. App. 443, 85 S.W. 128 (St. L. Ct. App.
1905) (due care was required); Dillon v. Continental Cas. Co., 130 Mo. App. 502,
109 S.W. 89 (K.C. Ct. App. 1908) ("mere negligence" did not bar recovery). For
other courts' interpretations of this exclusion when stated in the policy, see 45
C.J.S. Insurance § 774 (1946), 29A AM. JuR. Insurance § 1175 (1960), and 10
ANDERSON, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2 D §§ 41.474-.495 (1962).
16. 357 Mo. 187, 196, 207 S.W.2d 279, 285 (1947). Rarely do the accidental
death cases get to the Supreme Court because most double indemnity provisions
are $10,000 or less and thus the amount in issue does not meet the $15,000 mini-
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in issue. The court did, however, refuse plaintiff a cautionary instruction to this
effect solely because the jury might then totally exclude the negligence, intoxica-
tion and lack of judgment from consideration while these matters were still
relevant to the decisive issue of accident. In this case the insured remained in his
automobile in freezing weather and died after he froze his feet. He had consumed
a considerable amount of liquor. In Ward v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co.; 7 the Spring-
field Court of Appeals followed the Supreme Court by holding that without a policy
exception, voluntary exposure to danger would not affect submissability of the case
on the question of accident. Other courts have agreed by saying:
Voluntary exposure to danger by the holder of an accident policy will not
defeat recovery for an injury caused by accidental means, where such ex-
posure is not an exception in the policy, and the insured has no intention
of producing the injury received. s
Courts rarely inject matters into issue that are not specifically required by the
policy of insurance. When they do, it is likely that it is because they confuse a
relevant fact, here exposure to danger, with a necessary element of an issue. Con-
sequently, they prejudice a jury by making an issue out of what is merely a
relevant fact.
Concluding, it seems that the Kansas City Court of Appeals has blurred the
line separating accidental from intentional deaths to the point that there is an area
between the two that can only be defined as death not intentional but not within
the area of accident either. The best way to exclude certain accidental deaths from
accident insurance coverage is to insert a specific exclusion in the policy instead of
judically taking the meaning out of the term "accident."
It would be most helpful for the Supreme Court of Missouri to emphasize the
meaning of the presence or absence of certain exclusions in contracts of insurance
and to declare again that only those items the insurer expressly excluded will be
in issue and not items the insurer wishes he had excluded.
Scorr OR
17. 352 S.W.2d 413, 422 (Spr. Mo. App. 1961).
18. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Henkel, 234 F.2d 69, 71 (4th Cir. 1956),
Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Benion, 82 Ga. App. 571, 573, 61 S.E.2d 579, 581 (1950),
both quoting 29A AM. JUR. Insurance § 1179, at 320 (1960). Richards v. Standard
Acc. Ins. Co., 58 Utah 622, 641, 200 Pac. 1017, 1025 (1921) held, "Unless the de-
ceased intended to produce the very result which occurred, the element of danger
is both unimportant and immaterial. . . ." See also 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 774, at
805 (1946), which says, "Where, however, the policy does not contain an exposure
to danger provision, the element of danger is both unimportant and immaterial,
unless the insured intended to produce the very result which occurred."
[Vol. 30
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TORTS-AN EXTENSION OF THE HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
Miller v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co.1
A collision between plaintiff's automobile and defendant's streetcar occurred
at the intersection of Osage and Broadway in St. Louis. While there was some
dispute over certain portions of the evidence presented, the court concluded that
there was substantial evidence to justify the jury finding these facts: plaintiff had
driven east on Osage until he reached the intersection of Broadway. He stopped
and looked north and south. He saw no traffic approaching from the north, but
the approaching traffic from the south was heavy. He proceeded east until his
car straddled the southbound streetcar tracks, where he stopped to wait for an
opening in the northbound traffic. He again looked to his left (north) and saw
defendant's streetcar about 150 yards north of him stopped at a stop sign. Plaintiff
thereafter watched the northbound traffic and did not observe the streetcar.
According to the plaintiff, he had been stopped on the tracks for almost a full
minute when the streetcar struck his automobile on its left side.
The plaintiff based his claim solely on the theory of humanitarian negligence2
and he neither pleaded nor proved any personal injuries. Plaintiff submitted his
case on the instruction that the operator of defendant's streetcar ". . . saw, or in
the exercise of ordinary care on his part could have seen plaintiff with his automo-
bile in the aforesaid position of imminent peril .. 3. in time to have stopped the
streetcar and avoided the collision.
The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. The sole issue raised by defendant on
appeal was that the humanitarian doctrine (or fourth situation of constructive
notice of a mentally oblivious plaintiff)4 is not applicable where the only recovery
sought is for damage to a chattel. The St. Louis Court of Appeals, in a per curiam
decision, affirmed the trial court.5
1. 375 S.W.2d 641 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964).
2. The court concluded that the fact situation in the present case constituted
a fourth situation humanitarian doctrine of undiscovered mental obliviousness. See
note 4 infra.
3. Miller v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 1, at 642.
4. The use and meaning of the term "humanitarian doctrine" has been, and
to a considerable extent still is, susceptible to two completely different interpreta-
tions. For this reason the term "last clear chance" will be used in this note to re-
fer to the three classic last clear chance situations and the term "fourth situation
humanitarian doctrine" to refer solely to that peculiarly unique Missouri fourth
situation of constructive notice. See Becker, Thre Humanitarian Doctrine, 15 Mo. L.
REv. 359, 360 (1950), which distinguishes the factual situations of the three last
clear chance situations and the fourth situation humanitarian doctrine. In brief, the
three traditional last clear chance situations include:
1. Discovered physical peril.
2. Undiscovered physical peril (where there is a duty of lookout).
3. Discovered mental obliviousness.
The fourth situation humanitarian doctrine involves undiscovered mental oblivious-
ness (where there is a duty of lookout).
5. Miller v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 1. A motion for a rehearing
or transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court was denied.
19651
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Missouri has "enjoyed" the use of the fourth situation humanitarian dodtrine
as an extension of the traditional last clear chance doctrine in suits for personal
injuries since 1881 (or 1886).6 In the noted case the issue of whether the fourth
situation humanitarian doctrine applies solely to personal injuries or whether it
can also be applied to property damages was placed squarely before a Missouri
court for the first time.
Defendant argued that the fourth situation humanitarian doctrine was de-
signed to temper the harsh consequences of contributory negligence. Since its
origin and purpose was to permit a person who was injured to recover notwith-
standing his contributory negligence, it is a basis for recovery only in suits for
personal injuries. In support of this position defendant quotes from Krause v.
Pitcairn: "... . our humanitarian doctrine is reasoned upon precepts on humanity-
that tender regard every man must have for the life and limb of other men in
times of peace . ... 7
The court correctly indicated that the language from the Krause case, quoted
by defendant in support of his contention came from two other decisions, Murphy
v. Wabash R.R.8 and Dutcher v. Wabash R.R. 9 When those two courts used the
term "humanitarian doctrine" they were not using the term to apply solely to the
fourth situation but were using it to encompass all four situations. Likewise, the
language from the Sheenin case 0 also quoted by defendant came from two other
cases, Banks v. Morris & Co."' and Dey v. United Railways Co. of St. Louis.'2
These cases applied the term "humanitarian doctrine" not in any singular aspect,
but rather clearly indicated that their use of the term "humanitarian doctrine"
encompassed all four situations. Furthermore, when the courts in the Murphy,
Dutcher, Dey and Banks cases used the term "humanitarian doctrine" they were
considering last clear chance fact situations.
In short, the "humanitarian doctrine" phrases relied upon by defendant to
establish his contention that the fourth situation humanitarian doctrine should
apply only in cases of personal injury originated and were first applied in cases deal-
ing with last clear chance fact situations and, as used, the language applies to both
the last clear chance situations and the fourth situation humanitarian doctrine.
6. There seems to be a difference in opinion among Missouri authorities as
to the exact date and exact case that established the fourth situation humanitarian
doctrine in Missouri. See Schwartz, The Questionable Birth of the Missouri Hu-
,manitarian Doctrine, 14 J. Mo. B. 28, 31 (1958), in which Kelly v. Hannibal &
St. Joseph R.R., 75 Mo. 138 (1881), is acknowledged the establishing case. See also
McCleary, The Bases of the Humanitarian Doctrine Reexamined, 5 Mo. L. REV.
56, 76 (1940), in which Professor McCleary asserts that the decision of Donohue v.
St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry., 91 Mo. 357, 2 S.W. 424 (1886), estab-
lished the fourth situation humanitarian doctrine in Missouri.
7. 350 Mo. 339, 350, 167 S.W.2d 74, 78 (En Banc 1942). See also Sheenin v.
St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 300 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Mo. 1957), for a similar quote
relied upon by the defendant.
8. 228 Mo. 56, 80, 128 S.W. 481, 485 (En Banc 1910).
9. 241 Mo. 137, 160, 145 S.W. 63, 69 (En Banc 1912).
10. Sheenin v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 7.
11. 302 Mo. 254, 266, 257 S.W. 482, 484 (En Banc 1924).
12. 140 Mo. App. 461, 467, 120 S.W. 134, 136 (St. L. Ct. App. 1909).
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The court in the present case concluded the language relied upon by defendant
pertained to all four situations. Therefore, since the last clear chance doctrine has
always been applicable to suits for property damages,13 this language will not sup-
port the argument that the fourth situation humanitarian doctrine should apply
only to suits for personal injuries.14
It is noteworthy that all cases cited were railroad cases where the suits were
for personal injuries sustained by a plaintiff and caused by the railroad. Even
though those courts seem to be generalizing and formulating language to apply
under the heading of "humanitarian doctrine" to all four situations, they were
applying the language specifically to suits for personal injuries only. Irrespective
of the fact that those courts were using the term "humanitarian doctrine" to ap-
ply to all four situations, it is rather hard to fathom how the language "tender
regard ... for ... life and limb . . ."r applies to suits for property damages.
Also, if defendant had been more careful in his selection of case support for
his contention he could have cited cases such as Kelly v. Union RyY' where the
court in speaking of the recently established language of the fourth situation hu-
manitarian doctrine said: "It is a humane rule, conservative of human life and
consonant with public policy. It is based upon a recognition of the fact that human
beings . . . lose their lives, or sustain great bodily injury . . . ,,'1 From this case
the defendant could quite convincingly have argued that the original purpose or
reason for the adoption of the fourth situation humanitarian doctrine was to give
redress for personal injuries notwithstanding the injured person's contributory
negligence.
After disposing of defendant's single contention, the court bolstered their con-
clusion by citing six cases 8 to illustrate that
*.. since Banks v. Morris & Co. what we presently call our humanitarian
doctrineP9 has been applied or tacitly recognized as applicable where the
only recovery sought or allowed was solely for injuries to chattels, without
discussion of the issue here presented.20
13. 38 AM. JUR. Negligence § 225 (1941); 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 136 (1950);
Annot., 92 A.L.R. 47, 55 (1934).
14. Miller v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 1, at 645.
15. Krause v. Pitcairn, supra note 7, at 350, 167 S.W.2d at 78.
16. 18 Mo. App. 151 (St. L. Ct. App. 1885).
17. Id. at 156.
18. Wabash R.R. v. Darren Mills, 365 Mo. 827, 288 S.W.2d 926 (En Banc
1956); McKinney v. Robbins, 273 S.W.2d 513 (Spr. Mo. App. 1954); Roberts v.
Chicago, B&Q R.R., 266 S.W.2d 38 (K.C. Mo. App. 1954); Thomasson v. Hen-
wood, 235 Mo. App. 1211, 146 S.W.2d 88 (Spr. Ct. App. 1940); Yontz v. Sherna-
man, 94 S.W.2d 917 (K.C. Mo. App. 1936); Jacobson v. Graham Ship-by-Truck
Co., 61 S.W.2d 401 (K.C. Mo. App. 1933). The most that can be said of these
cases is that some of them grant tacit approval to a suit for property damages under
the fourth situation humanitarian doctrine.
19. Here the court uses the term "humanitarian doctrine" to denote the
fourth situation humanitarian doctrine.
20. Miller v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 1, at 645. It should be
noted that the court could have cited a Missouri case which indirectly permitted
a suit under the fourth situation humanitarian doctrine that allowed a recovery
of property damages. In Brungs v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 235 S.W.2d 81
19651
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The court advanced one final argument in support of their decision. They rea-
soned that the same principle of law should apply to both personal injuries and to
property damages, that human rights should not prevail over property rights.
Since the fourth situation humanitarian doctrine has always -been applied to suits
for personal injuries, it should likewise apply to suits for property damages to pro-
mote uniformity of the law. The court reasoned that it is just as inhumane to dam-
age or destroy a chattel when the injury may be avoided as it is to injure a per-
son; therefore, logic and justice require the uniform application in both situations.
Whether it is just as "inhumane" to damage a chattel as it is to injure a per-
son is, of course, a questionable assertion and necessarily raises a debatable issue.
Likewise the assertion that personal rights should not prevail over property rights
is open to question.
When this problem of applicability of the fourth situation humanitarian
doctrine to suits for property damages is viewed in perspective, two conclusions
-become rather obvious. First, it seems clear that the fourth situation humanitarian
doctrine was originally developed for the purpose of affording relief for personal
injuries notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent be-
cause of mental obliviousness.
Second, prior to Banks v. Morris & Co. 21 each individual case could be dis-
tinguished as involving either mental obliviousness or physical helplessness. Now
since: "It is of no consequence what brings about, or continues, the situation of
peril. It may be through the obliviousness of the one imperiled, or through his
inability to extricate himself from his environment ...,,2 this distinction between
mental obliviousness and physical helplessness is no longer necessary. And with
this distinction went, for all practical purposes, the traditional distinction 'between
last clear chance situations and the fourth situation humanitarian doctrine. All
that is now needed is notice or constructive notice of a position of imminent peril.
(St. L. Mo. App. 1951), a plaintiff recovered both personal and property damages
in a humanitarian doctrine action. That suit constituted a factual situation of un-
discovered mental obliviousness; however, the issue of property damages was
never raised. See also Finke v. United Film Serv., 363 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. 1962),
where the plaintiff alleged both personal and property damages and brought suit on
both primary and humanitarian doctrine negligence theories. He subsequently
abandoned the primary negligence theory and relied entirely on the humanitarian
doctrine theory. Although this case does not constitute an application of the fourth
situation humanitarian doctrine (the facts seem to indicate it was a last clear
chance situation of undiscovered peril) it is easy to see how the same result could
come about with a fourth situation humanitarian doctrine factual situation.
21. 302 Mo. 254, 257 S.W. 482 (En Banc 1924).
22. Banks v. Morris & Co., supra note 21, at 267, 257 S.W. at 484. In conjunc-
tion with this statement the court in the Banks case established a five-fold test to
determine whether a cause of action would arise under a given state of facts:
(1) Plaintiff was in a position of peril; (2) defendant had notice
thereof (if it was the duty of defendant to have been on the lookout,
constructive notice suffices); (3) defendant after receiving such notice
had the present ability, with the means at hand, to have averted the im-
pending injury without injury to himself or others; (4) he failed to exer-
cise ordinary care to avert such impending injury; and (5) by reason
thereof plaintiff was injured.
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The Missouri courts have simply expanded the use of the term "humanitarian
doctrine" from its original applicability to the fourth situation of constructive
notice of mental obliviousness.2 3 Since the Banks decision its use has become that
of an all inclusive term which, when applied to the present test of position of im-
minent peril, encompasses all four previously distinguishable situations.
True, the language of the Banks case requires "(5) by reason thereof plaintiff
was injured."24 However that language necessarily includes recovery for property
damage under previously distinguishable last clear chance situations (which has
always been recognized).25 Therefore it would seem that the language also includes
recovery for property damage under a previous fourth situation humanitarian
doctrine factual situation. Since, pursuant to Banks, it is no longer necessary to
distinguish between last clear chance situations and the fourth situation humani-
tarian doctrine why, or how, distinguish when property damages are recoverable? 20
Therefore if the term "humanitarian doctrine" is equated with the fourth
situation humanitarian doctrine that required a mentally oblivious plaintiff and was
originated to afford this oblivious plaintiff a remedy for his personal injuries, the
present decision cannot .be sound. However, the Banks decision resulted in the
fusion of the three traditional last clear chance situations and the fourth situation
humanitarian doctrine into a requirement of only discovery (or constructive dis-
covery) of a position of imminent peril. Therefore, historical or original intent of
the fourth situation humanitarian doctrine notwithstanding, the present case pre-
sents simply another step in the evolution of this theory of recovery.
STE~nEm H. RoMmES
23. Supra note 4.
24. Supra note 22.
25. Supra note 13.
26. See §§ 17.14 and 17.15 of Missouri Approved Jury Instructions (1964)
where the Banks language is accepted and no distinction drawn between mental
obliviousness and physical helplessness. The two terms are not used. The instruc-
tions instead speak of "immediate danger."
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